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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Case No. 910500 
Category 3 
RONNIE LEE GARDNER, 
Petitioner-Appellee 
and Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden 
of the Utah State Prison, 
State of Utah, 
Respondent-Appel1ant 
and Cross-Appellee. 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER-APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT 
Ronnie Lee Gardner, Petitioner-Appellee and Cross-Appellant 
herein, was the petitioner in the district court and will be 
referred to by name or as the Petitioner. Respondent-Appellant and 
Cross-Appellee, the State of Utah, will be referred to as the 
prosecution or the State. In references to the record, "T.lf will 
refer to the transcript of Mr. Gardner's preliminary hearing and 
trial, and "H." will refer to the transcript of the evidentiary 
hearing conducted in the district court on November 27 and 28, 
1990. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The State appeals from a decision of the Salt Lake County 
District Court granting in part a Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus and/or for Postconviction Relief filed by Ronnie Lee 
Gardner, and vacating his death sentence. The district court 
granted relief on the grounds that Mr. Gardner received ineffective 
1 
assistance at sentencing, due to counsel's failure to investigate 
and present mitigating evidence, and on direct appeal. Mr. Gardner 
cross-appeals from the district court's decision to deny his 
petition on other grounds. The Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court correctly conclude that trial 
counsel provided ineffective assistance, based on its findings of 
fact that they unreasonably waited until after the guilty verdict 
to seek mental health mitigating evidence, and never obtained 
psychological, neurological or medical testing or investigated the 
probability that Mr. Gardner suffered from organic brain damage? 
2* Did the district court correctly determine that Mr. 
Gardner received ineffective assistance on direct appeal, under the 
following circumstances: appellate counsel did not raise important 
issues; the original appellate attorneys worked in the same public 
defender's office as trial counsel; the replacement appellate 
attorney represented a co-defendant in the case; the replacement 
attorney was not accurately informed of the scope of his 
representation; original appellate counsel continued to submit 
documents although they had been removed from the case because of 
conflicts; and original appellate counsel wrote briefs and 
petitions on the issue of ineffective assistance of the public 
defenders and submitted them to replacement counsel for filing? 
3. When a court in postconviction review determines that a 
defendant under a death sentence received ineffective assistance of 
2 
appellate counsel for the reasons discussed above, must he be 
allowed an appeal with effective assistance from independent 
counsel? 
4. Did trial counsel provide effective assistance in this 
capital case when, in addition to the grounds found by the district 
court: (1) they were witnesses at the scene of Mr. Gardner's 
arrest and their theory of defense depended on establishing their 
client's mental and physical states at that time, yet they 
continued to represent him in violation of the witness-advocate 
rule; (2) they had conflicts of interest due to their relationships 
with the State's witnesses and due to the development of animosity 
between them and their client; (3) they failed to ensure the 
preservation of an adequate record of the trial and related 
matters, including Mr. Gardner's requests that they withdraw; (4) 
they did not adequately investigate and present their theory of 
defense; (5) they failed to object to inadmissible hypnotically-
enhanced testimony; (6) they unreasonably decided that Mr. Gardner 
should testify and exerted undue pressure to gain his acquiescence; 
(7) in their client's testimony, they introduced the fact that he 
had been convicted of numerous felonies, which were inadmissible 
under Utah Rule of Evidence 609; (8) they failed to object or to a 
request a bifurcated procedure to deal with the aggravating 
circumstance that Mr. Gardner "was previously convicted of . . . a 
felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person," under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1 )(h); (9) they stipulated to the 
existence of an aggravating circumstance, without their client's 
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permission; (8) they never investigated the constitutional validity 
the prior convictions used against their client; (9) they did not 
challenge the use of an aggravating circumstance alleged by the 
State, although there was authority available to argue that it did 
not apply; and (10) they did not request personal voir dire, or 
request an opening statement in the penalty phase? 
5. Should a conviction and death sentence be vacated when 
they are based on inherently unreliable, hypnotically-enhanced 
testimony from the State's central witness? 
6. In a capital case, should the defendant receive an 
advisement from the court concerning his rights to testify or 
remain silent, and matters affecting the decision whether to take 
the stand? May trial counsel in a capital case coerce the 
defendant into testifying? 
7. Was Mr. Gardner's right to presence violated when the 
trial court conducted hearings on motions in his absence? 
8. Was the Utah Constitution's requirement of a reasoned and 
reliable capital sentencing proceeding violated when the State was 
allowed to disclose and argue evidence of the victim's good 
character, but Mr, Gardner was not permitted to present testimony 
in mitigation from the victim's friends and relatives that the 
victim would have wanted him to receive a life sentence? 
9. Can the death penalty be constitutionally imposed when 
the trial court fails to instruct jurors on all applicable 
mitigating circumstances listed in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2)? 
10. Should jurors in a capital case be instructed in 
4 
accordance with State v, Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 84 & n.10 cert, denied, 
459 U.S. 988 (Utah 1982), that the State must establish the 
existence of any aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable 
doubt? 
11. Where a petitioner convicted of a capital crime and 
sentenced to death files a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
and/or for Postconviction Relief asserting that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, does the postconviction 
court commit error and violate the United States and Utah 
constitutions in refusing to appoint expert witnesses and an 
investigator to assist him in preparing and presenting the case? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented in Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4 are based on 
trial and appellate counsel's ineffective assistance. Issues of 
ineffective assistance of counsel are mixed questions of law and 
fact. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); State v. 
Tempi in. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). The factual components of 
the question are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard, 
requiring this court to grant great deference to the trial court's 
findings of fact. State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1987). 
In addressing legal components, this Court applies the "correction 
of error" standard and is not required to view the trial court's 
rulings with deference. Tempiin. 805 P. 2d at 186. 
The issues presented in Questions 5, 7, 8 and 9 also appear to 
be mixed questions of law and fact. The issues presented in 
Questions 6, 10 and 11 address questions of constitutional rights, 
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statutory interpretation or conclusions of law, and are reviewed 
under the "correction of error" standard. State v. James. 819 P. 
2d 781, 796 P. 2d (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution, and the corollary provisions of the 
Utah Constitution, are relevant to this appeal. The Fifth 
Amendment provides in pertinent part that: 
[N]or shall [any person] be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
The Sixth Amendment provides that: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defense. 
The Eighth Amendment states that: 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted. 
The Fourteenth Amendment states in pertinent part that: 
. . . [N]or shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution provides that: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
6 
Article I, § 9 of the Utah Constitution provides that: 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive 
fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual 
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned 
shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 
Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution states in pertinent part: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to 
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall 
nay accused person, before final judgment, be compelled 
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. . . . 
Other constitutional and statutory provisions and court rules will 
be referred to as necessary in the text of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In October 1985, Mr. Gardner was tried by a Salt Lake County 
jury on charges of First Degree Murder, Attempted First Degree 
Murder, Aggravated Kidnapping, Escape and Possession of a Dangerous 
Weapon by an Incarcerated Person. On October 22, 1985, the jury 
found him guilty as charged, and in the penalty phase of trial, 
conducted on October 24 and 25, 1985, decided that he should be 
executed. The trial court's judgment sentencing Mr. Gardner to 
death was entered on October 25, 1985.x 
1
 On the non-capital offenses, Mr. Gardner received two 
terms of five years to life and two sentences of one to 15 years in 
the Utah State Prison, with each sentence to be served 
consecutively. 
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On January 31, 1989, this Court rejected the issues raised on 
direct appeal and affirmed Mr. Gardner's conviction and sentence. 
Gardner v. State. 789 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989), cert, denied. 494 U.S. 
1090 (1990). Rehearing was denied on November 15, 1989. On April 
16, 1990, the United States Supreme Court denied Mr. Gardner's 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
On June 29, 1990, the district court set an execution date of 
August 24, 1990. On the same date, undersigned counsel were 
appointed to represent Mr. Gardner on a volunteer basis, with the 
court ruling that they were not entitled to compensation for their 
work on his behalf. On July 16, 1990, Mr. Gardner filed his 
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or for Postconviction 
Relief. On August 8, 1990, the district court granted a stay of 
execution. 
The Honorable Raymond S. Uno conducted an evidentiary hearing 
on November 27 and 28, 1990. After the submission of briefs from 
Mr. Gardner and the State, Judge Uno issued his decision on July 
26, 1990. Judge Uno held that Mr. Gardner was entitled to a new 
sentencing hearing and to a new direct appeal because he had 
received ineffective assistance of counsel at those stages of the 
case. Relief on all other grounds was denied. 
The State's Motion for New Trial was filed on August 5, 1991 
and denied on October 7, 1991. The State's Notice of Appeal was 
filed on October 28, 1991, and Mr. Gardner's Notice of Cross-Appeal 
was timely filed thereafter. 
8 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This case arose from a highly publicized incident at the 
Metropolitan Hall of Justice on April 2, 1985. On that morning, 
Mr. Gardner was brought from the Utah State Prison to attend a 
court hearing in a murder case, known as the "Cheers" case. Mr. 
Gardner was represented in that other case by Andrew Valdez and 
James Valdez, two brothers who worked as lawyers in the Salt Lake 
Legal Defenders Association. 
As the prison guards brought him into the lobby in the 
basement of the courthouse, a woman appeared and handed a gun to 
Mr. Gardner. In an exchange of gunfire as the guards left the 
building, Mr. Gardner was shot in the chest, through his lung. In 
looking for an exit, Mr. Gardner entered a file room where attorney 
Michael Burdell was shot. After shooting a uniformed bailiff who 
confronted him, Mr. Gardner was led from the basement by a prison 
officer. He compelled a vending machine serviceman to walk with 
him outside the building, where he then collapsed on the lawn. 
At the same time, Andrew Valdez and James Valdez were 
approaching the courthouse for the scheduled motions hearing. As 
Andrew Valdez was crossing the street to the courthouse: 
I looked across the street, I saw Ronnie in the plaza 
area of the Metropolitan Hall of Justice. He went down, 
I couldn't hear what was going on because the sirens 
were, there was all kinds of commotion. And he went down 
on the lawn, and I ran across the street and saw that he 
was bleeding from the chest area. 
(H. 113). Andrew Valdez was told by a prison officer that Mr. 
Gardner had killed a lawyer, and his first thought was that his 
9 
brother, James, had been shot. (H. 114). Mr. Valdez went to Mr. 
Gardner on the courthouse lawn and asked him about James. In 
response, Mr. Gardner asked to be taken to a hospital. Andrew 
Valdez was removed from the scene by a detective, and was the first 
person Mr. Gardner recognized after collapsing on the lawn. (H. 
74, 113-14). 
James Valdez also observed Mr. Gardner at the scene of his 
arrest. As Mr. Valdez arrived at the courthouse in his car, he 
heard sirens and saw Mr. Gardner on the lawn. (H. 193-94). He 
immediately approached Mr. Gardner and asked about his brother, 
Andrew. Mr. Valdez was afraid that Andrew had been harmed, not 
necessarily by Mr. Gardner. (H. 194). Mr. Gardner said that he 
did not know where Andrew was. Mr. Valdez also testified that he 
inquired whether Mr. Gardner was okay, and Mr. Gardner said he was 
in some pain. (H. 194-95). Mr. Valdez then was ordered behind a 
barricade, but he continued to observe until Mr. Gardner was 
removed from the scene. (H. 196). 
In the guilt phase of trial, counsel's theory of defense was 
that Mr. Gardner had not intended to kill Michael Burdell, and that 
the shooting was "essentially a reaction, a reaction after having 
been shot." (H. 131). Trial testimony from Robert Macri, a 
witness to the shooting as well as a friend and colleague of Mr. 
Burdell, was "devastating" to this defense. (H. 141). After the 
preliminary hearing and before trial, Mr. Macri was hypnotized at 
his request, in an attempt to remember more details about the 
incident. 
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Counsel did not withdraw despite the fact that they were 
witnesses to the effects of the shooting on Mr. Gardner. At the 
hearing conducted by the district court, Andrew Valdez testified 
that he did not believe his presence at the scene created a 
conflict. (H. 137-138). James Valdez testified that he was not 
sure whether he considered being a witness, and that he 
"apparently" decided not to. (H. 198, 199). 
The record does not contain any waiver by Mr. Gardner of his 
right to conflict-free counsel. The transcripts and clerk's file 
also lack any record of Mr. Gardner's requests that counsel 
withdraw. Testimony from Mr. Gardner and from counsel confirms 
that he asked them at least twice to withdraw prior to trial. One 
such request occurred on the Friday before trial, and was brought 
to the trial judge's attention, apparently off-the-record. (H. 86-
87, 127-28). 
In addition to failing to withdraw because they were witnesses 
at the scene, trial counsel did not take steps necessary to present 
their theory of defense. Counsel did not obtain ballistics 
evidence about the impact of the gunshot, and they failed to 
correct witnesses' erroneous testimony that Mr. Gardner was wounded 
in the shoulder rather than in his chest and lung. 
The State relied upon three aggravating circumstances in the 
guilt phase of trial. One was the circumstance set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1 )(h), and the State therefore was required to 
prove that Mr. Gardner had been previously convicted of a violent 
felony. Counsel did not request a bifurcated procedure to address 
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the prejudicial impact of revealing this information to the jury 
before it has considered whether he is guilty or not guilty of the 
acts charged. 
In fact, at the beginning of the guilt phase, counsel 
stipulated without Mr. Gardner's permission to the existence of two 
convictions satisfying § 76-5-202(l)(h). (T. 766); (H. 93). 
Further, counsel did not investigate thoroughly to determine 
whether these convictions were constitutionally obtained. They did 
not review transcripts of Mr. Gardner's pleas or talk to his 
previous attorneys. (H. 223). 
Mr. Gardner testified at trial, but believed that counsel 
coerced him into taking the stand. (H. 90). Counsel then elicited 
testimony from Mr. Gardner describing prior felony convictions 
including two robberies, attempted escape, burglary, two aggravated 
assaults and homicide. (T. 1186-87). Counsel believed that 
disclosing Mr. Gardner's felony record was necessary to "steal the 
thunder" from the prosecution, which would be entitled to introduce 
the information in cross-examination. (H.149). 
Counsel called Mr. Gardner as a witness despite their belief 
that his testimony in the guilt phase would open the door to 
impeachment with his prior felony convictions and to rebuttal 
testimony from Wayne Jorgensen.2 (H. 148, 152). 
2
 Jorgensen was a prison guard who claimed that, while 
hospitalized after the shooting, Mr. Gardner admitted that he 
intentionally killed Michael Burdell. At the State's request, the 
district court below ruled that the issue of ineffective assistance 
of counsel in respect to Jorgensen's testimony had been resolved on 
appeal, See 789 P. 2d at 288, and therefore is exhausted for 
purposes of any federal court review. 
12 
On October 22, 1985, the jury found Mr. Gardner guilty of 
first degree murder. Counsel then obtained a one-day recess to 
prepare for the penalty phase of trial. Counsel had not obtained 
expert testimony to explain psychiatric, psychological or 
neurological conditions affecting Mr. Gardner. 
In the day following the guilty verdict, counsel arranged for 
Mr. Gardner's evaluation by Dr. Peter Heinbecker. In the 24 hours 
before he testified, Dr. Heinbecker was able only to interview Mr. 
Gardner for about one hour, to spend a total of two-and-a-half 
hours with his mother and brother and to review some records. 
These records did not include the results of current psychological 
and neurological testing, because counsel had not sought these 
tests. Dr. Heinbecker testified that, in a case of this 
significance, he would have expected more time to prepare his 
evaluation. (H. 214). The doctor "tried to pick out . . . general 
factors that were important," and found in old records " some 
evidence of organic brain damage." (T. 1577). However, Dr. 
Heinbecker was cross-examined effectively by the prosecutor, whose 
questions established the deficiencies in the rushed, incomplete 
evaluation. 
On direct appeal, Mr. Gardner continued to be represented by 
the Salt Lake Legal Defender's Association, and specifically by 
lawyers including Andrew Valdez and James Valdez. 
However, Mr. Gardner became dissatisfied with his appellate 
representation, and requested that counsel withdraw. This Court 
eventually granted this request. The following findings of fact 
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from the district court describe what occurred: 
Mr. Ed Brass was appointed to replace the Salt Lake Legal 
Defenders Association based on petitioner's claim he received 
ineffective appeal. Mr. Brass filed a supplemental brief 
arguing there was no evidentiary record to frame the issue of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition/ it is not 
contested that Mr. Brass was appointed by the Supreme Court's 
order, a copy of which order he claims not to have received, 
to file a supplemental brief to address matters not previously 
addressed. Consequently, based on a telephone conversation 
with Chief Justice Hall, he understood he was appointed only 
to address the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel at 
trial. Mr. Brass claims to not have received a copy of its 
opinion. 
A further problem exists. 
The Supreme Court's order discharging the Salt Lake County 
Legal Defenders Association was not scrupulously honored. 
Attorney Joan Watt testified she was instructed in an informal 
telephone call from the Supreme Court's clerk to file the 
appropriate documents in Mr. Gardner's behalf after the 
decision affirming his conviction and sentence was announced. 
Although the Supreme Court had decided that he was entitled to 
independent counsel on the ineffective assistance issue, Ms. 
Watt also prepared the Supplemental Petition for Rehearing and 
supplemental reply to State's Response to Appellant's Petition 
for Rehearing, which were signed and filed by Mr. Brass. 
Memorandum Decision at 28. 
The district court concluded that Mr. Gardner did not receive 
effective, conflict-free representation on appeal. 
Additional facts will be referred to as necessary in the 
Argument section of this brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court correctly concluded that Mr. Gardner 
received ineffective assistance of counsel in his capital 
sentencing because counsel did not adequately or timely investigate 
and present mental health evidence. The court's findings of fact 
on this issue were based in part on its assessment of witness 
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credibility, and are supported by the record. Recognizing that Mr. 
Gardner's ability to establish prejudice was thwarted by the 
State's objection to the provision of expert witnesses, the 
district court also determined that counsel' s deficient performance 
met the second prong of the ineffective assistance standard of 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The State has not 
established that the court clearly erred in its factual resolutions 
underlying the decision that Mr. Gardner is entitled to a new 
sentencing hearing because trial counsel were ineffective. 
Further, the district court correctly concluded that counsel's 
actions and omissions were unreasonable. 
The State also has not satisfied the clearly erroneous 
standard of review concerning the district court' s factual findings 
in support of its determination that Mr. Gardner's appellate 
counsel provided ineffective assistance. 
In ruling on the remaining grounds supporting Mr. Gardner's 
claim that trial counsel were ineffective, the district court 
applied an incorrect standard of prejudice under the second prong 
of Strickland v. Washington. The court erred in requiring Mr. 
Gardner to establish that counsel's deficiencies were prejudicial 
"beyond a reasonable doubt." In addition, the court clearly erred 
in finding that Mr. Gardner waived his right to conflict-free 
counsel at trial, particularly with respect to counsel's violation 
of the witness-advocate rule. 
The district court erroneously concluded that only harmless 
error resulted form the admission of hypnotically-enhanced 
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testimony from Robert Macri at trial. A review of the record shows 
that Mr. Macrifs testimony, and its alteration followed hypnosis, 
was significant rather than cumulative and unimportant. 
The court below also erred in ruling that there was not need 
for an advisement from the trial court on Mr. Gardner's right to 
testify or remain silent at trial, and that his right to presence 
was not violated. 
The district court erroneously concluded that references to 
the victim's character and the impact of his death were not 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the verdict, and that any 
error was harmless. 
The district court wrongly decided that the omission of a jury 
instruction defining the mitigating circumstance of duress under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2) was not error. 
The court below also committed an error of law in concluding 
that the trial judge was not required to give an instruction 
stating that the prosecution had the burden of proving the 
existence of aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Mr. Gardner's ability to present his case throughout this 
postconviction proceeding has been thwarted by the district court's 
refusal to appoint defense investigators and expert witnesses. The 
lack of expert and investigative assistance has resulted in a 
hearing which was not full and fair, and violates Mr. Gardner's 
rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, §§7, 9 and 12 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT MR. GARDNER 
RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN THE SENTENCING 
PHASE OF THIS CAPITAL CASE. 
The right to counsel is one of the bedrock principles of 
American criminal jurisprudence. Because representation by counsel 
is essential to guarantee other constitutional privileges, the 
Sixth Amendment is not satisfied unless counsel plays "the role 
necessary to ensure that the trial is fair." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). Therefore, "the right to 
counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel." McMann 
v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, n.14 (1970). 
Ineffective assistance of counsel is established when the 
record demonstrates that the attorney's performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness considering the circumstances 
of the case, and that the accused was prejudiced by the incompetent 
representation. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 692; State v. Frame, 
723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) (Per curiam). To demonstrate that he 
was prejudiced by counsel's error, the defendant must show a 
"reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different" 
in the absence of deficient performance. "A reasonable probability 
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome." 466 U.S. at 694; 723 P.2d at 405. 
The nature of the case as a capital proceeding is one of the 
circumstances to be considered in evaluating claims of ineffective 
assistance. In Strickland, the Court recognized that ff[w]hen a 
defendant challenges a death sentence . . . , the question is 
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whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent [counsel's] 
errors, the sentence . . . would have concluded that the balance of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death." 
466 U.S. at 695. 
A higher standard of competence is not required of counsel in 
a capital case. However, the potential severity of the punishment 
is a factor to be evaluated in determining whether counsel's 
performance was reasonable under the circumstances. Cronic, 466 
U.S. at 666; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 704-06 (Brennan, J., 
concurring). According to the Tenth Circuit, "In a capital case 
the attorney's duty to investigate all possible lines of defense is 
strictly observed." Coleman v. Brown. 802 F.2d 1227, 1233 (10th 
Cir. 1986). 
Because the nature and substance of the penalty phase trial 
"differ[s] radically in form and in issues addressed from those 
about the commission of a crime.... [c]apital cases require 
perceptions, attitudes, preparation, training, skills that ordinary 
criminal defense attorneys may lack." G. Goodpaster, The Trial for 
Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases. 58 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 299, 303-04 (1983). The investigation, discovery, 
preparation and presentation of mitigating evidence is the most 
critical function of the defense in a capital case. 
In this appeal, the State challenges the district court's 
conclusion that counsel provided ineffective assistance at 
sentencing because they failed to adequately investigate and 
present mitigating evidence. After receiving evidence from Mr. 
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Gardner, trial counsel and mental health professionals, and 
necessarily weighing their credibility in resolving conflicts in 
their testimony, Judge Uno found that: 
Primarily, there was inadequate investigation relating to 
petitioner's mental health prior to trial. Whatever 
evidence was presented was inadequate—too little and too 
late. There is dispute regarding Dr. Peter Heinbecker's 
testimony. Was there sufficient time and sufficient 
medical or psychological evaluations for Dr. Heinbecker 
to adequately and completely testify in behalf of 
petitioner? The Court is of the opinion there was not. 
Dr. Heinbecker was contacted a mere 24 hours before he 
testified. 
*** 
Dr. Mark Rindflesh, a psychiatrist, evaluated 
petitioner in May 1985. He apparently was not asked to 
testify for petitioner. . . .Dr. Agnes Plenk was asked 
to evaluate or testify in behalf of petitioner, but she 
declined. No further effort was made to seek 
professional assistance for petitioner, nor seek State 
assistance in doing so. In addition, present counsel's 
efforts to secure expert testimony for petitioner's 
evaluation was opposed by the State and sustained by this 
Court. As a result, no satisfactory mental health 
evaluation of petitioner has ever been available to 
petitioner to present at any hearing. 
Petitioner contends the deprivation of adequate 
evaluations has prevented petitioner from presenting any 
evidence of possible organic brain damage or other 
mitigating information which further prevented 
presentation of "a cohesive and understandable theory of 
mitigation," The Court agrees. 
Memorandum Decision, at 23-24. The court also found that Mr. 
Gardner was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, and 
therefore ordered a new sentencing hearing. 
Ignoring the findings of fact in Judge Uno's ruling, the State 
contends in this Court that it lacks support in the record. 
According to the State, "The evidence demonstrates that trial 
counsel expended every reasonable effort to find a psychological 
expert to testify on petitioner's behalf." (Brief of Appellant, at 
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12). This argument is refuted by a review of the record and the 
factual findings made by Judge Uno. The State cannot meet its 
burden of establishing that the district court's findings are 
clearly erroneous. 
In its opening brief, the State presents only selected facts, 
contrary to it obligation to identify the evidence supporting the 
trial court's findings. See State v. Larsen, 828 P. 2d 487, 491 
(Utah App. 1992) [(citing Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange. 817 
P.2d 789 (Utah 1991)]. In Larsen, the court of appeals stated 
that: 
To prove that the trial courts findings of fact were 
clearly erroneous, "an appellant must marshall all evidence in 
favor of the facts as found by the trial court and then 
demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to 
support the findings of fact." Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P. 2d 
198, 199-200 (Utah 1991). If an appellant fails to marshall 
the evidence, "the appellate court assumes that the record 
supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a 
review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law 
and the application of that law in the case." Id. at 199. 
828 P. 2d at 490 
There was no reasonable justification for the delay in seeking 
psychiatric or psychological evidence in mitigation. Andrew Valdez 
attempted to justify this delay by claiming that it was caused by 
the reluctance of expert witnesses to become involved in the case. 
However, the district court below made a finding of fact that the 
defense efforts to obtain expert assistance were limited, 
inconsistent with Mr. Valdez' testimony, and therefore rejected his 
attempted explanation. 
Dr. Mark Rindflesh was asked by counsel to evaluate Mr. 
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Gardner shortly after the incident. He interviewed Mr. Gardner for 
approximately one hour during a barrier visit at the Utah State 
Prison on May 10, 1985. Dr. Rindflesh then wrote to Andrew Valdez 
a letter which included the following: 
I suspect the critical issue in trying to 
present as favorable a picture of Mr. Gardner 
as possible to the jury will be whether or not 
he has a conscience. Does he really feel 
remorse for his action? If he is so very 
impulsive and acts without thinking he may 
well feel sorry later. I did not try to get 
into this area of discussion since I was 
talking to him via telephone and could only 
see him through a small window. Discussing a 
subject such as this requires the opportunity 
to receive the nonverbal communication as well 
as the verbal. Perhaps an interview in a more 
open setting will be possible in the future. 
(Exhibit P-l). However, Andrew Valdez testified that Dr. Rindflesh 
was reluctant to testify in his behalf. (H. 126). 
Andrew Valdez also testified that he and co-counsel then 
discussed Mr. Gardner and the reports they had obtained with Dr. 
Agnes Plenk, a child psychologist. According to Mr. Valdez, "we 
thought she was going to come down and do a personal interview and 
any other assessments necessary, and she backed out at the last 
minute.11 Mr. Valdez testified that Dr. Plenk "just didn't want to 
be associated with the case." (H. 121). Mr. Valdez also said: 
We then contacted, I believe we contacted 
another doctor, and that could have been Dr. 
Lebegue or another doctor, but we found 
problems getting people to associate 
themselves with the case, because of the 
nature of the publicity and things of that 
nature. 
(H. 122) (Emphasis added). 
This attempted explanation is contradicted by testimony from 
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Dr. Rindflesh, Dr. Plenk and co-counsel, James Valdez.3 Dr. 
Rindflesh testified that he did not receive any records or 
background information concerning Mr. Gardner from counsel. (H. 
236). Dr. Rindflesh was not asked to testify for Mr. Gardner and 
was never given the opportunity to evaluate him in a barrier-free 
setting. (H. 237). 
Dr. Agnes Plenk testified that Andrew Valdez and James Valdez 
came to her office at The Children's Center to ask her to examine 
Mr. Gardner or "speak in his defense." (H. 258). However, Dr. 
Plenk declined to do so because she had not previously had any 
professional contact with Mr. Gardner. (H. 257). After the 
meeting, which lasted about 20 minutes, Dr. Plenk immediately 
communicated her decision to counsel. (H. 256-57). 
James Valdez verified that Dr. Plenk informed them at the end 
of the meeting, at least one month before trial, that she would not 
evaluate Mr. Gardner or testify. (H. 203,231). James Valdez did 
not consult with any other doctors after the conversation with Dr. 
Plenk. (H. 203). James Valdez did testify that their contact with 
Dr. Heinbecker was delayed because the psychiatrist had only 
recently moved to Utah. (H. 217). However, this statement was 
inaccurate, as Dr. Heinbecker testified that he had arrived in Utah 
in July 1984, more than one year before trial. (H. 204). 
The State argues that counsel's failure to obtain a timely and 
3Even if the excuse offered by Andrew Valdez was accurate, he 
did not ask the trial court to appoint an expert to assist in 
presenting mitigation and did not seek to find an expert from 
another state, who would not have been affected by negative 
publicity. (H. 180) 
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thorough assessment of mental health mitigation was reasonable 
strategy because experts who were contacted had only unfavorable 
evaluations. The district court did not make this finding, and as 
explained below, it is not supported by the record. In addition, 
if there were any negative evaluations, they were based on 
examinations that were incomplete and unreliable, as outlined 
below. Therefore, based on his review of the testimony and other 
evidence, Judge Uno declined to find that counsel's inaction was 
strategic. 
Andrew Valdez also claimed that the failure to timely obtain 
mental health testimony was based on the fact that he had received 
evaluations diagnosing Mr. Gardner as sociopathic. However, when 
asked who had provided these diagnoses before Dr. Heinbecker's 
evaluation, Mr. Valdez identified only Roger Pray, a Utah State 
Prison psychologist, and Dr. Rindflesh. (H. 179-80). 
Mr. Valdez admitted that he didn't "necessarily" accept the 
prison psychologist's conclusions and felt it was important to 
obtain an independent evaluation. (H. 123). Further, Dr. 
Rindflesh demonstrated a willingness to cooperate rather than a 
reluctance to get involved, and he did not provide a specific 
diagnosis in his report. (Exhibit P-l). 
Counsel did not seek any psychological testing before Dr. 
Heinbecker's evaluation, and testing was not possible when he did 
enter the case, because it was so late in the day. Counsel 
specifically did not arrange to have Mr. Gardner tested for organic 
brain syndrome. (H. 164). Mr. Gardner had been ill with spinal 
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meningitis as a child, and he had a history of sniffing inhalants. 
(H. 162,164). Andrew Valdez testified that Dr. Heinbecker told 
them organic brain damage was "insignificant". (H. 164,165). 
However, this assertion is contradicted by Dr. Heinbeckerfs 
penalty phase testimony. An indication in early records that Mr. 
Gardner had organic brain damage was one of the four factors Dr. 
Heinbecker described as important. (T. 2796). In cross-
examination, however, the prosecutor and Dr. Heinbecker discussed 
whether organic brain syndrome had been concretely diagnosed or was 
merely mentioned as a possibility, and Dr. Heinbecker maintained 
that sufficient testing had not been conducted in Mr. Gardner's 
earlier evaluations. By questioning Dr. Heinbecker about records 
he had not reviewed, the prosecutor was able to negate the 
suggestion that organic brain syndrome could be important. Dr. 
Heinbecker could not point to any current testimony in response 
because none had been sought by counsel. 
Dr. Heinbecker testified before the district court that the 
psychological testing not obtained by counsel, including specific 
tests for organic brain syndrome, would have been helpful in 
formulating his diagnosis. (H. 214-15). These tests should have 
been conducted before Mr. Gardner's evaluations by Dr. Rindflesh 
and Dr. Heinbecker. The inaccurate assertion that Dr. Heinbecker 
told counsel in the 24 hours before he testified that organic brain 
syndrome was "insignificant" does not excuse the failure to timely 
obtain an assessment of the disease. Without this information, 
counsel could not adequately evaluate potential mitigating 
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evidence. In fact, Andrew Valdez did not know, and still does not 
understand, how to determine or prove the presence of organic brain 
syndrome. (H. 165). 
The district court correctly held that counsel's lack of 
preparation and investigation resulted in a haphazard, 
ineffective presentation of mitigation evidence and was not 
reasonable under the circumstances: 
"If trial counsel does not adequately investigate the 
underlying facts of a case, . . . counsel's performance cannot 
fall within the 'wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance.'" State v. Templin, 805P. 2d at 188 (citations 
omitted). 
Trial counsel did not provide the medical experts who 
evaluated Mr. Gardner with current test results or critical 
information about his background, history and, as a result, their 
assessments were not reliable. An accurate forensic psychiatric 
examination requires careful assessment of medical and organic 
factors contributing to or causing psychiatric or psychological 
dysfunction. See H. Kaplan and B. Sadock, Comprehensive Textbook 
of Psychiatry, 543 (4th ed. 1985). 
The recognized method of assessment includes the following 
steps: (1) An accurate medical and social history must be 
obtained. See R. Straub & F. Black, Organic Brain Syndromes 42 
(1981); Kaplan & Sadock at 837; (2) Historical data must be 
obtained not only from the patient, but from sources independent of 
the patient. Kaplan & Sadock at 488. See also. American 
Psychiatric Association, "Report of the Task Force on the Role of 
Psychiatry in the Sentencing Process," Issues in Forensic 
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Psychiatry 202 (1984); Pollack, Psychiatric Consultation for the 
Court, 1 Bull. Am. Acad. Psych. & L. 267, 274 (1974); H. Davison, 
Forensic Psychiatry 38-39 (2d ed. 1965); (3) A thorough physical 
examination (including neurological examination) must be conducted. 
See, e.g.. Kaplan & Sadock at 544, 837-38 & 964; and (4) 
Appropriate diagnostic studies must be undertaken in light of the 
history and physical examination.4 These authorities establish 
that the standard mental status examination cannot be relied upon 
in isolation as a diagnostic tool in assessing the presence or 
absence of organic impairment. See Kaplan & Sadock, at 835. 
Based on counsel's unreasonable failure to investigate 
mitigating mental health evidence, the district court held that Mr. 
Gardner had received ineffective assistance and specifically found 
that prejudice was sufficiently established under the 
circumstances.5 
"The sentencing hearing is counsel's chance to show the jury 
The psychiatric profession recognizes that psychological 
tests, CT scans, electroencephalograms, and other diagnostic 
procedures may be critical to determining the presence or absence 
of organic damage. In cases where a thorough history and 
neurological examination still leave doubt as to whether 
psychiatric dysfunction is organic in origin, psychological testing 
is clearly necessary. See Kaplan & Sadock at 547-48; Pollack at 
273. Moreover, among the available diagnostic instruments for 
detecting organic disorders, neuropsychological test batteries have 
proven to be critical. See Filskov & Goldstein, Diagnostic 
Validity of the Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological Battery, 42 J. 
of Consulting & Clinical Psych. 382 (1974); Schreiber, Goldman, 
Kleinman, Goldfader, & Snow, The Relationship Between Independent 
Neuropsychological and Neurological Detection and Localization of 
Cerebral Impairment, 162 J. of Nervous and Mental Disease 360 
(1976). 
5
 See Argument X, below. 
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that the defendant, despite the crime, is worth saving as a human 
being." Mak v. Blodqett. 970 F.2d 614, 619 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, 
however, as the district court held, trial counsel did not present 
"a cohesive and understandable theory of mitigation." Memorandum 
Decision, at 24. 
As it did in the court below, the State contends that "no 
attempt was made t explain [organic brain syndrome] or how it 
applied to petitioner's case." (Brief of Appellant, at 14). In 
addition, the State complains that Mr. Gardner did not present 
evidence that he in fact suffers form organic brain syndrome or 
that other mitigating information exists. The State argues that 
any finding or prejudice is only speculative. 
However, the State ignores the simple fact that MR. Gardner, 
as an indigent person on death row, did not have the money to hire 
expert witnesses and investigators. Mr. Gardner sought the 
appointment of experts and investigators necessary to discover and 
evaluate mitigating information; the States strenuously opposed all 
requests for expert and investigative assistance. The state's 
argument that Mr. Gardner did no produce concrete evidence — 
which could have been presented if he had been provided with 
experts and investigators — is disingenuous at best. 
Further, unlike the defendant in the case cited byt eh State, 
Mr. Gardner's efforts to show that he was prejudiced did not rest 
only on y the claim of "some conceivable impact," and the record 
does not demonstrate that he "made no effort to delineate any 
prejudice." State v. Lowell, 758 P. 2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988). 
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Mr. Gardner's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments and Article 1, §§7, 9 and 12 of the Utah 
Constitution were violated.6 The district court below correctly 
found that he should be provided a new sentencing hearing. As the 
State has not demonstrated that the facts found by the court are 
clearly erroneous and that its legal conclusions are incorrect, 
this Court must affirm the order for resentencing. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT MR. GARDNER 
RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ON DIRECT APPEAL. 
Testimony at the evidentiary hearing established that Mr. 
Gardner initially was represented on appeal by the Salt Lake Legal 
Defenders Association. However, as the appeal progressed, Mr. 
Gardner was dissatisfied with this representation and requested 
that counsel withdraw. After originally denying Mr. Gardner's 
request, the Utah Supreme Court later ordered attorneys from the 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association to withdraw. Attorney Ed 
Brass was appointed to represent Mr. Gardner, but did not receive 
copies of the Order appointing him, which broadly defined the scope 
of his representation. (H. 282). Instead, Mr. Brass believed 
based on a telephone conversation with Chief Justice Hall that he 
was to proceed only on the issue of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel. (H. 281-82). 
Mr. Brass had represented co-defendant Carma Hainsworth in the 
6
 See State v. Sireci, 536 So.2d 231 (Fla. 1988) (where 
court-appointed psychiatrist failed to order necessary testing, 
defendant deprived of due process); Mason v. State, 489 So.2d 734 
(Fla. 1986) (mental status examination of defendant flawed because 
physicians did not know of extensive history of mental disorders). 
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trial court, but did not believe that this created a conflict of 
interest because her case was completed. (H. 282-83). Mr. Brass 
prepared a supplemental brief which argued that Mr. Gardner's 
ineffective assistance claim was not ripe for review, but did not 
raise any additional issues. When the supreme court affirmed Mr. 
Gardner's conviction, Mr. Brass did not receive a copy of the 
opinion from the supreme court. (H 284). Mr. Brass filed a 
Petition for Rehearing, although it actually had been prepared by 
attorney Joan Watt from the Legal Defenders Association. (H. 285-
86). See Exhibit P-2. 
These exceptional circumstances establish that appellate 
counsel for Mr. Gardner operated under an actual conflict of 
interest, which adversely affected their performance. The trial 
court correctly found that Mr. Gardner did not receive effective, 
conflict-free representation on appeal. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 
U.S. 387 (1985). The State argues that the district court 
misconstrued the circumstances of the Ed Brass appointment and that 
there was no deficient performance. Again, the State does not 
discuss the court's findings of fact on this issue, which accord 
with the recitation above and are found at page 28 of its 
Memorandum Decision, or otherwise support any attempt to establish 
that they are clearly erroneous. The State also claims that Mr. 
Gardner was required to show prejudice after the district court 
found that he did not receive representation from an independent 
advocate. This argument is contrary to decisions that hold a 
showing of Strickland prejudice is not required when an actual 
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conflict of interest exists. E. q.. Osborn v. Shillinqer, 861 F. 2d 
612 (10th Cir. 1988). The State also contends that the district 
court erred in ordering a new appeal. Just as a remedy for 
ineffective assistance at trial is a new trial, a new appellate 
process is the only way to rectify the problem of deficient 
representation on appeal. The appropriate remedy here is to allow 
an appeal at which Mr. Gardner could be represented by independent 
counsel. The fact that claims are now presented in postconviction 
is no substitute for independent evaluation of issues on direct 
appeal. Cf. Wilson v. Wainwright, 474 So. 2d 1165 (Fla.1985) 
(Florida Supreme Court's independent review of records on appeal 
does not substitute for effective assistance of appellate counsel, 
and petitioner was entitled to a new direct appeal.) 
III. MR. GARDNER RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT 
TRIAL AND SENTENCING, ON THE GROUNDS ARGUED BELOW IN ADDITION 
TO THE SIXTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS FOUND BY THE DISTRICT COURT. 
A. Conflicts of Interest 
In addition to the guarantee of reasonably competent 
representation, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel incorporates 
the right to counsel's undivided loyalty. Hollowav v. Arkansas, 
435 U.S. 474 (1977); United States v. Burnev, 756 F.2d 787, 790 
(10th Cir. 1985); State v. Brown, No. 900148 (Utah November 30, 
1992); State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697 (Utah 1980). To establish a 
Sixth Amendment violation based on a conflict of interest, a 
defendant who does not object at trial must show that his attorney 
actively represented conflicting interests and that an actual 
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conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. 
However, a further showing of prejudice is not required. United 
States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494 (10th Cir. 1990); State v. Webb, 790 
P.2d 65, 73 (Utah 1990). Prejudice is presumed because "it is 
difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of 
representation corrupted by conflicting interests." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. at 692. 
Both the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct,7 effective 
January 1, 1988, and the previous Code of Professional 
Responsibility8 prohibit Mr. Gardner's representation by Andrew 
Valdez and James Valdez because they witnessed events surrounding 
his apprehension. This Court has addressed the advocate-witness 
rule in State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650 (Utah 1985). This Court 
recognized in Leonard that: 
The great weight of authority, however, is 
that it is error for counsel to continue 
representation where he or she is or ought to 
be a witness with respect to issues that are 
not incidental or insignificant. It is widely 
recognized that the credibility of an attorney 
who acts as a witness in his client's case, as 
well as his effectiveness as an attorney in 
7Rule 3.7(a) provides that "A lawyer shall not act as advocate 
at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness 
except where: (1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services 
rendered in the case; or (3) Disqualification of the lawyer would 
work substantial hardship on the client." 
8DR 5-102(A) precluded a lawyer from serving as an advocate if 
the lawyer "learned or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his 
firm ought to be called as a witness on behalf of his client." DR 
5-102(B) provided that a lawyer could continue representation as a 
potential witness other than on behalf of his client "until it is 
apparent that his testimony is or may be prejudicial to his 
client." 
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that case, may be seriously compromised. 
*** 
Experience teaches that the roles of 
advocate and witness should be separated. If 
an attorney attempts to combine the two roles, 
he is likely to be less effective in each 
role. "That counsel should avoid appearing 
both as advocate and witness except under 
special circumstances is beyond question." 
United States v. Morris, 714 F.2d 669, 671 
(7th Cir. 1983). 
707 P.2d at 653 (Other citations omitted). (Emphasis added.) 
Counsel's representation was improper although Andrew Valdez 
has stated that his potential testimony might have countered Mr. 
Gardner's theory of defense, (H. 137). This conflict similarly was 
not excused by James Valdez' explanation that he did not testify 
because he didn't believe he "could add anything" to the facts 
presented at trial, as he did not know how much time had passed 
between the occurrence and his observations of Mr. Gardner, (H. 
199). 
"A different attorney would be in a better position to assess 
the existence and extent of any personal knowledge which [counsel] 
may have, and whether he would be of any benefit. . .as a defense 
witness." United States v. Seiqner. 498 F.Supp. 282, 286 (E.D. Pa. 
1980). 
Further, the advocate-witness rule does not depend on whether 
counsel will be or is actually called to testify, but rather, "on 
whether he 'ought to be called as a witness' in the underlying 
action." Groper v. Toff. 717 F.2d 1415, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Per 
curiam). Accord, e.g., United States v. Cannistraro, 794 F. Supp. 
1313, 1321 (D. N.J. 1992) ("Prejudice to the client has been found 
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when the mere presence of defense counsel at trial would distort 
the fact-finding process or when defense counsel would become an 
unsworn witness"); United States v. Gotti, 771 F. Supp. 552, 561-63 
(E.D.N.Y. 1991) (Regardless of whether counsel would be called to 
the stand, he could not present defense without acting as an 
unsworn witness). 
Here, Andrew Valdez recognized that their defense depended on 
information from "witnesses who talked to [Mr. Gardner] shortly 
after he'd been shot." (H. 134). In the defense case, counsel 
called Brad Snow, a witness who had observed Mr. Gardner leave the 
courthouse and collapse on the lawn outside. Mr. Snow described 
Mr. Gardner's demeanor as "confused," but in cross examination the 
prosecutor established that he was approximately 150 feet away. (T. 
2475, 2477). Additionally, James Valdez attempted during cross-
examination of a prosecution witness to introduce facts about his 
own conduct at the scene. (T. 2340). 
Bringing this matter to the jury's attention "would cause any 
argument to the jury about that testimony to be viewed as a 
statement of a witness as well as of an advocate." United States 
v. Iorizzo. 786 F.2d 52, 57 (2nd Cir. 1986); accord. Mannhalt v. 
Reed. 847 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1988). 
Under these circumstances, trial counsel were potential 
witnesses and were obligated to withdraw from representation. The 
failure of Mr. Gardner's trial attorneys to recognize their duty to 
withdraw resulted in the denial of his right to effective counsel, 
and violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
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and the Utah Constitution. 
Andrew Valdez and James Valdez also had conflicts of interest 
because they knew Nick Kirk, whom Mr. Gardner shot in attempting to 
leave the basement, and other witnesses. James Valdez testified 
that they discussed these matters with Mr. Gardner. "I think 
finally, on the record, Ronnie waived, we asked if he was willing 
to waive that possibility that we may be witnesses9 or that we knew 
individuals, we knew all the courtroom personnel, that sort of 
thing." Mr. Valdez believed that Mr. Gardner waived potential 
conflicts, on the record in district court. (H. 197). 
However, the record of the proceedings in district court does 
not contain any discussion of the subject or any waiver by Mr. 
Gardner. Andrew Valdez testified that he did not think the fact 
that he had been a witness at the scene created a conflict of 
interest. (H. 137-38). In light of his failure to recognize the 
conflict, it is doubtful that he obtained even an off-the-record, 
informal waiver from Mr. Gardner. Counsel had an obligations to 
bring these matters to the court's attention. See Cuvler v. 
Sullivan. 446 U.S. 335, 346 (1980). 
Additionally, there was animosity between Mr. Gardner and 
counsel, particularly Andrew Valdez. Andrew Valdez testified that 
he and Mr. Gardner "had a lot of problems," primarily 
dissatisfaction about confinement conditions. (H. 117). At one 
point, Mr. Gardner attempted to plead guilty because he believed it 
9James Valdez testified that he was not sure whether or not he 
considered being a witness, and that he did contemplate testifying 
but "apparently" decided not to do so. (H. 198,199). 
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was the only the way to get out of the "hole." (T. 1088-94). He 
felt that Mr. Valdez was not doing anything to help the confinement 
situation. (H. 88). The attorney-client relationship seemed to be 
"hot and cold." (H. 86,117). According to James Valdez, the 
variations in Mr. Gardner's emotional conditions were justifiable, 
under the circumstances. (H. 230). 
Mr. Gardner asked counsel to withdraw two times, including on 
the Friday before trial started. (H. 87,127). This matter 
apparently was brought to the attention of the prosecutor and the 
trial court, although it does not appear in the record. The trial 
judge either denied Mr. Gardner's request because trial was 
imminent, or it was withdrawn after further discussion with 
counsel. (H. 87,127-28). 
The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that "Death is 
. . . different." Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). 
Capital cases create unique pressures, and it is imperative that 
the accused trust in his attorney. See G. Goodpaster, The Trial 
for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases. 
58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 321, 323 (1983). Proceeding to trial with a 
capital defendant who has just sought counsel's withdrawal is an 
untenable situation. Counsel did not seek a continuance, ensure 
that a record of Mr. Gardner's dissatisfaction was preserved or 
withdraw so that Mr. Gardner could be represented by lawyers who 
did not have a turbulent relationship with him. 
In addressing these conflicts, the district court noted that 
no record of any waiver had been found. Nonetheless, the court 
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stated that "the problems regarding the Valdezes representing 
petitioner was discussed with petitioner and petitioner waived any 
issued of conflict of interest." 
With due respect to the district court, this finding is 
clearly erroneous as it is unsupported by the records. The 
evidence in support to the finding is testimony from James Valdez 
that he thought Mr. Gardner waived any conflict on the records. 
(H. 197). However, James Valdez testimony also demonstrates 
uncertainty about whether he even considered being a witness, let 
alone obtaining a valid, informed waiver on the records. (H. 198, 
199). Andrew Valdez did not even treat his presence at the scene 
as a conflict requiring a waiver. (H. 137-138). 
The district court additionally erred in concluding that Mr. 
Gardner was not entitled to relief because any conflicts of 
interest were outweighed by the fact that "there is no prejudice 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Memorandum Decision, at 24. As 
explained above, a showing of prejudice is not required when an 
actual conflict of interest is demonstrated. This erroneous legal 
standard requires reversal of the district court's decision denying 
relief on the basis of counsel's conflict of interest. 
B. Inadequate Representation 
When a claim of ineffective assistance is not based on a 
conflict of interest, reversal is required if a defendant 
establishes that counsel's performance was deficient and that the 
deficiency prejudiced the defense. The "deficient performance" 
prong is satisfied by proof that counsel's representation "fell 
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below an objective standard of reasonableness/1 based on prevailing 
professional norms. Strickland. 466 U.S. at 688; State v. Frame. 
723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) (Per curiam). The "prejudice" prong 
of the test is met by demonstrating a "reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different." 466 U.S. at 694, 723 P.2d at 405. 
The district court rejected Mr. Gardner's additional claims 
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial on 
the merits. According to the court below, the State presented 
overwhelming evidence of Mr. Gardner's guilt at trial, and 
therefore he could not be prejudiced by any errors or omissions of 
counsel. The court's ruling on this issue was erroneous, because 
there is a reasonable likelihood that jurors would have found Mr. 
Gardner guilty only of a lesser offense trial counsel had been 
effective advocates. 
Throughout its decision below, the district court held that, 
although there was some deficiency in counsel's performance, there 
was no prejudice because of the weight of the direct evidence of 
guilt. Memorandum Decision, at 14. The court then ruled on 
specific grounds asserted by Mr. Gardner that, "the deficiency was 
not prejudicial beyond a reasonable doubt." E. q.. Memorandum 
Decision at 19, 21, 23, 26. The district court applied a clearly 
erroneous legal standard in requiring Mr. Gardner to show beyond a 
reasonable doubt the result would have been different but for 
counsel's errors and omissions. 
Counsel did not effectively investigate and present the 
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defense that Mr. Gardner did not intend to kill Michael Burdell and 
that the scooting was "essentially a reaction, a reaction after 
having been shot." (H. 131). No reasonable explanation has been 
provided for the failure to clarify for jurors that Mr. Gardner 
suffered a wound to his chest and lung, rather than simply to his 
shoulder. Throughout the trial, witnesses referred inaccurately to 
Mr. Gardner's "shoulder" wound and counsel did not correct this 
error. Counsel further perpetuated this mischaracterization by 
referring to a shoulder wound in briefs filed in the direct appeal. 
Counsel also failed to investigate whether ballistics evidence 
was available to support the defense. At the trial, counsel cross-
examined Raymond Cooper in an attempt to explore the impact of the 
shot. Mr. Cooper testified that he could not discuss this matter 
because his expertise was in firearms identification rather than 
ballistics. (T. 1157-59). Counsel did not call any witnesses or 
present any evidence on this issue. It is clear from counsel's 
testimony before the district court that there was no strategic 
reason for this omission.10 Ballistics testimony would have been 
significant, as indicated by the fact that counsel sought 
unsuccessfully to elicit information from a witness not qualified 
on that topic. The district court agreed that there was "some" 
10
 Andrew Valdez testified that he "believed" he talked to 
a ballistics expert, who "probably would have been Ed Barton," an 
investigator in the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association. (H. 
133,135). However, Mr. Valdez could not remember whether Mr. 
Barton provided a report or why the defense did not present 
testimony from an expert in ballistics. (H. 134,135,136). James 
Valdez testified that he could not remember whether they sought 
ballistics testing, and said "I don't think we thought it was a 
question of ballistics." (H. 226-27). 
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deficiency in counsel's failure to present their defense 
adequately. However, the court found that there was no prejudice 
because of the extent of direct evidence showing Mr. Gardner's 
guilt. However, this evaluation necessarily is affected by 
counsel's failure to competently present their defense. The 
district court erred in concluding that Mr. Gardner suffered no 
prejudice. 
Counsel's decision that Mr. Gardner should testify in the 
trial on the merits also was not reasonably competent. Counsel 
believed that Mr. Gardner's prior convictions would be admitted to 
impeach if he were to testify and knew that jurors "would have a 
totally different picture of Ronnie Lee Gardner" once that 
happened. (H. 148). They additionally were aware that the 
prosecution would offer the testimony of Corrections Officer 
Jorgensen in rebuttal if Mr. Gardner testified. (H. 151-52). 
Counsel also knew that Mr. Gardner would refuse to disclose the 
name of the woman who handed him the gun on the morning of April 2, 
1985, and that his refusal "was going to hurt." (H. 155). 
In the hearing, Mr. Gardner said that he was reluctant to 
testify because his prior convictions would then be admitted. (H. 
89). Although Andrew Valdez testified that Mr. Gardner wanted to 
take the stand, he also admitted that Mr. Gardner "may have had 
reservations at one point," and that "there was days" when Mr. 
Gardner did not want to testify. (H. 147). Mr. Gardner believes 
that he was coerced into testifying, because his brother was asked 
by Andrew Valdez to write to him and urge him to take the stand. 
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(H. 90-92,158). Counsel acted unreasonably in deciding that Mr. 
Gardner should testify and exerting pressure to gain his 
acquiescence. 
Near the beginning of Mr. Gardner's testimony, counsel 
elicited the information that he had been convicted of numerous 
felonies, including two robberies, attempted escape, burglary, two 
aggravated assaults and homicide.11 (T. 1186-87). At the 
evidentiary hearing, Andrew Valdez testified that this was an 
attempt to "steal the thunder" by disclosing Mr. Gardner's record 
before it was admitted by the prosecution to impeach his testimony. 
(H. 149). If these convictions were admissible to impeach Mr. 
Gardner, trial counsel's decision would have been reasonable. 
However, these convictions were inadmissible under Rule 609 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 609 provides that a defendant's testimony can be 
impeached with evidence that he has been convicted of a crime which 
"involved dishonesty or false statement," or a felony not involving 
dishonesty or false statement only if "the court determines that 
the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect." State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986); 
State v. Gentry. 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987). In the absence of a 
showing of specific facts indicative of fraudulent action, the 
crimes of theft, second degree burglary and robbery ordinarily do 
not involve dishonesty or false statement. State v. Bruce, 779 
nIn cross-examination, the prosecutor brought up an additional 
conviction for escape. (T. 1214). 
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P.2d 646 (Utah 1989); State v. Lanier. 778 P.2d 9 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Brown, 771 P.2d 1093 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Wight. 765 
P.2d 12 (Utah App. 1988). The prior convictions elicited by 
counsel therefore were not admissible under this part of Rule 609. 
If the prosecution had sought admission under the other clause 
in the rule, it would have had to establish that the probative 
value of each conviction outweighed its prejudicial impact. 
Because the nature of Mr. Gardner's convictions are not probative 
of his character for veracity and they were similar to the offenses 
for which he was on trial, so as to be extremely prejudicial, 
admission of these convictions over an objection would have been an 
abuse of discretion. Gentry, 747 P.2d at 1037-38. Because Mr. 
Gardner's prior convictions were inadmissible, there was no 
strategic or tactical reason for their introduction in his direct 
examination. (H. 168). See State v. Morehouse. 748 P. 2d 217, 220-
221, (Ut. App. 1988) (Jackson,J. dissenting) cited with approval in 
Bruce. 779 P. 2d at 656. The district court denied relief on this 
ground because it ruled that Utah law at the time of Mr. Gardner's 
trial allowed introduction of his felony history for impeachment 
purposes. Memorandum Decision, at 17. This legal conclusion is 
erroneous. 
Although Banner and Gentry had not been decided, Rule 609 had 
been in effect since for two years at the time of Mr. Gardner's 
trial. The rule's departure from the former practice of admitting 
all felony convictions to impeach was signaled in the Advisory 
Committee Note, which stated that "This rule is the federal rule, 
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verbatim, and changes Utah law by granting the court discretion in 
convictions not involving dishonesty or false statement to refuse 
to admit the evidence if it would be prejudicial to the defendant. 
Current Utah law mandates the admission of such evidence." 
Treatises interpreting the identical federal provision also 
provided a framework for arguing that Mr. Gardner's prior 
convictions were not admissible to impeach under Rule 609. E.g., 
M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence. §§ 609.2, 609.4 (1981); 3 
D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence. § 316 (1979). 
Mr. Gardner also was prejudiced by counsel's failure to 
request a bifurcated procedure to deal with an aggravating 
circumstance based on prior convictions. One of the three 
statutory aggravating circumstances to be proved at trial was the 
allegation that Mr. Gardner "was previously convicted of.. .a felony 
involving the use or threat of violence to a person." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(h). When this aggravating circumstance is 
asserted, it is error to introduce evidence of any alleged prior 
convictions in the guilt phase, before the jury has determined 
whether the accused is guilty of an intentional or knowing killing. 
A bifurcated procedure is required to alleviate prejudice to the 
accused. State v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 458 (Utah 1989); State v. 
James. 767 P.2d 549 (Utah 1989). 
Although Florez and James were decided after Mr. Gardner's 
trial, counsel should have been alerted to the prejudicial impact 
of admitting prior convictions under § 76-5-202(1)(h). As the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized in James, bifurcated proceedings had been 
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required in other contexts "to insure that such prejudice based 
upon a defendant's 'status1 as a previously convicted felon will 
not taint a jury's fact finding task." 767 P.2d at 556. 
Counsel's unreasonable decision that Mr. Gardner should testify, 
their introduction of his prior convictions and their failure to 
request a bifurcated proceeding were errors which intensified each 
other's effect and prejudiced Mr. Gardner. 
The district court recognized that Mr. Gardner's contentions 
on these issues were "very strong". Memorandum Decision, at p. 18. 
However, the court ruled, "Again, based on the strength of the 
direct evidence regarding petitioner's guilt, the Court finds that 
assistance of counsel may represent some deficiency in the above 
facts, but rules that the deficiency was not prejudicial beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Memorandum Decision, at p. 19. The court 
erroneously applied the reasonable doubt standard to the Strickland 
prejudice prong, which correctly requires Mr. Gardner to show only 
a "reasonable probability" of a different outcome. This Court 
should remand these issues back to the district court, with 
instructions to apply the correct and more lenient definition of 
prej udice. 
IV. MR. GARDNER'S CONVICTION MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE IT WAS BASED 
ON HYPNOTICALLY ENHANCED TESTIMONY. 
Hypnotically enhanced testimony is inadmissible in Utah, 
because its "inherent unreliability . . . is well established." 
State v. Tuttle. 780 P.2d 1203, 1210 (Utah 1989); accord. State v. 
Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1989). See also. Rock v. Arkansas. 
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483 U.S. 44, 59-60 (1987). The Arizona Supreme Court, which this 
Court has cited with approval on the issue, has summarized: 
(1) The subject under hypnosis is extremely 
susceptible to suggestions given intentionally 
or unintentionally by the hypnotist or others 
present during the session. The source of 
suggestions could be verbal or nonverbal cues 
given by the hypnotist of which even the 
hypnotist is unaware. 
(2) The subject is likely to confabulate by 
filling in details of memory gaps to make his 
account of events more logical, complete, and 
acceptable. Additionally, it is impossible 
for either the subject or a hypnosis expert to 
determine whether a given piece of information 
is actual memory or confabulation, absent 
independent verification such as a record of 
the subject's pre-hypnotic recall. 
(3) The subject may confound memories evoked 
under hypnosis with prior recall. Thus, it 
becomes impossible to distinguish between 
memories of impressions existing before 
hypnosis and memories of impressions generated 
during hypnosis. 
(4) The subject of hypnosis develops a 
distorting desire to please the hypnotist. 
(5) The subject of hypnosis generally becomes 
absolutely confident in the accuracy of his 
recall, thereby unfairly impairing effective 
cross-examination of the subject about the 
event. 
(6) The subject loses critical judgment 
because he is willing to speculate and then 
give credence to such speculation. 
State ex rel. Neelv v. Sherrill. 799 P.2d 849, 852-53 (Ariz. 1990) 
(Citations omitted). 
In Tuttle, this Court held that a witness who has been 
hypnotized may testify, but his or her testimony must be limited to 
"prehypnotic recall as it has been recorded before hypnosis." 780 
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P.2d at 1211. The scope of testimony from a previously hypnotized 
witness should be determined prior to trial. 780 P.2d at 1211, 
n.10. Additionally, testimony deviating from recorded prehypnotic 
recall may be stricken and expert testimony could also be admitted 
to explain the witness's unwarranted confidence in the improper 
testimony and the unreliability of the post-hypnotic 
"recollection." 780 P.2d at 1212. 
In the instant case, Robert Macri was a crucial witness. Mr. 
Macri was in the basement archives room when Mr. Gardner attempted 
to escape from prison officers at about 9 a.m. on April 2, 1985. 
Mr. Macri and Michael Burdell hid behind the door from the foyer 
into the archives room. Mr. Gardner entered the room and walked 
past them, then turned. Mr. Gardner shot Mr. Burdell, who had been 
hiding closest to the hinge of the door, and Mr. Macri left the 
room by going around the door, which was swinging shut or had been 
closed. 
In the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Macri testified that he had 
been uncertain about how the door had closed. (H. 26). During the 
summer of 1985, Mr. Macri and his wife were receiving marriage 
counseling from Dr. Elliott Landau. Because Mr. Macri was under a 
lot of pressure and "really mystified," Dr. Landau placed him under 
hypnosis to help him recall what had happened. (H. 27). At the 
end of this session, which probably occurred in August 1985, (H. 
27), Dr. Landau gave Mr. Macri a posthypnotic suggestion that he 
would continue to think about the matter until he resolved the 
issue. (H. 28-29). At some later time, as Mr. Macri and a friend 
45 
were driving to California, "all of the sudden I saw that I had 
used the door as a shield and had pulled it closed behind me." (H. 
29). 
Mr. Macri explained that his trial testimony reflected this 
understanding and therefore differed from his preliminary hearing 
testimony. (H. 29). At the preliminary hearing, Mr. Macri 
testified that the door started to close, he began to go around it 
and he heard the shot "practically simultaneously." (T. 960-61, 
964). Mr. Macri also stated that the gun was pointed at his head 
when Mr* Burdell said "Oh, my God." Then, "I just ducked. For no 
reason at all, I ducked and went around the swinging door, and the 
gun went off." Mr. Macri was "coming around the door" when the 
shot was fired. (T. 949). At trial, Mr. Macri testified that he 
was holding the door and keeping it from closing. According to his 
testimony, Mr. Gardner walked past them, turned, and pointed the 
gun at him. (T. 2215). Mr. Macri testified that Mr. Burdell said 
"Oh, my God," Mr. Gardner moved the gun and: 
When it got to the point exactly between Mike 
and myself—which was 18 inches, at the most, 
the space between us—when he got to just the 
halfway point, I ducked and went out the door 
as I believe that I was holding the door at 
that time. I was keeping the door from 
closing. 
(T. 2217). 
These two versions differed materially. Mr. Maori's testimony 
at the preliminary hearing supported the theory that the shooting 
of Mr. Burdell was not an intentional killing, because the rt?fmse 
could argue that Mr. Gardner, who was bleeding from a gunshot wound 
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in the chest, had been startled when the door suddenly began to 
close and Mr. Macri moved out. However, the trial testimony 
indicates that Mr. Gardner was already moving the gun toward Mr. 
Burdell when Mr. Macri let go of the door and it began to close. 
As was the evidence in Tuttle and Mitchell. Mr. Macrifs 
hypnotically enhanced testimony was truly unreliable and was 
inadmissible as a matter of Utah evidentiary law. The district 
court below erred in concluding that Mr. Gardner's trial was not 
affected by the use of post-hypnotic testimony. The court 
erroneously speculated that the change in Mr. Macri's testimony was 
caused by something other than his hypnosis session. Memorandum 
Decision, at 6. Additionally, the district court mistakenly 
concluded that Mr. Macri was not an important witness and that his 
testimony was merely cumulative. 
Additionally, although this Court in Tuttle did not decide 
whether the use of hypnotically enhanced testimony can violate a 
defendant's due process and confrontation rights, 780 P.2d at 1213, 
other courts have determined the existence of constitutional 
violations on a case-by-case basis. E.g.. Bundy v. Dugger, 850 
F.2d 1402, 1415 (11th Cir. 1988); Harker v. State of Maryland. 800 
F.2d 437 (4th Cir. 1986). In the instant case, any lack of 
knowledge that Mr. Macri's testimony was hypnotically enhanced 
merely exacerbates these constitutional violations. 
Dr. Landau testified that Mr. Macri's was hypnotized without 
the safeguards normally expected in a hypnosis session conducted 
for forensic purposes, which include obtaining sufficiently 
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detailed information about prehypnotic recall and video and audio 
tapes of the session itself. (H. 60). The absence of these 
precautionary measures made Mr. Macri's hypnotically enhanced 
testimony particularly untrustworthy. Further, if trial counsel 
were not aware at the time of trial that Mr. Macri had been 
hypnotized, then their ability to effectively cross-examine him was 
frustrated. Jurors were not informed that Mr. Macri had been 
hypnotized and were not aware of his explanation for the change in 
his testimony. There was no expert testimony to analyze the 
hypnosis session itself, or to describe the effects of hypnosis. 
The use of this testimony therefore did not comport with due 
process of law, and violated Mr. Gardner's right to confront the 
witnesses against him. U.S. Const., Am. VI, XIV; Utah Const., Art. 
1/ §§ 7, §12. Mr. Gardner's conviction and sentence must be 
vacated unless the State establishes that this error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Even under the evidentiary standard 
announced in Mitchell and Tuttle, reversal is required because, in 
the absence of this testimony, there was a reasonable likelihood of 
a more favorable result in either the guilt or penalty phase of 
trial. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ADVISE MR. GARDNER OF 
HIS RIGHTS TO TESTIFY OR REMAIN SILENT. 
The district court below erroneously rejected Mr. Gardner's 
contention that an advisement concerning his right to testify or 
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remain silent should have been given by the trial court.12 Because 
these two corollary rights are fundamental and personal privileges, 
see, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987); Brooks v. 
Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972); Mallov v. Hoqan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), 
their waiver must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent. Johnson 
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). To make an effective decision 
about whether or not to testify, and thereby validly waive the 
right to testify or to remain silent, the accused should be advised 
of these rights, of the consequences of testifying or not 
testifying, and of the fact that the decision is his to make 
notwithstanding counsel's advice. 
An advisement from the trial court is necessary to protect 
against the possibility that counsel will undermine or supplant the 
defendant's decision whether to take the stand or decline to 
testify. See People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504 (Colo. 1984). The 
instant case demonstrates the need for an adequate advisement from 
the court: Mr. Gardner felt that counsel coerced him into 
testifying at trial, although he personally did not want to do so. 
(H. 89, 90). Here, an adequate advisement from the trial judge 
would have alleviated the effect of counsel's undue pressure 
coercion on Mr. Gardner, and was necessary to protect his rights 
under the state and federal constitutions. U.S. Const, Am. VI, 
VIII, and XIV; Utah Const., §§ 7, 9 and 12. 
The record does not contain an advisement on these 
issues, although Valdez testified that the trial court informed Mr. 
Gardner of matters concerning his right to testify. (H. 154). 
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VI. MR. GARDNER'S RIGHT TO PRESENCE WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE TRIAL 
COURT CONDUCTED PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THIS CAPITAL CASE 
WHILE HE WAS ABSENT. 
The due process right of the accused to be present during 
judicial proceedings is one of the most fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Diaz v. 
United States. 223 U.S. 442, 447-48 (1912); Lewis v. United States, 
146 U.S. 370 (1892); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 579 (1884). 
Recently, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the continuing 
validity of this right: 
The Court has assumed that, even in situations where the 
defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or 
evidence against him, he has a due process right "to be 
present in his own person whenever his presence has a 
relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his 
opportunity to defend against the charge." Snyder v. 
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 ... (1934). Although 
the Court has emphasized that this privilege of presence 
is not guaranteed "when presence would be useless, or the 
benefit but a shadow," ... at 106-07, ... due process 
clearly requires that a defendant be allowed to be 
present "to the extent that a fair and just hearing would 
be thwarted by his absence," ... at 108, .... Thus, a 
defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any 
stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its 
outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness 
of the procedure. 
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987). A defendant's right 
to presence also is recognized in Article I, § 12 of the Utah 
Constitution. State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677 (Utah 1986). 
Prior to trial in the instant case, the trial court conducted 
a hearing on co-defendant Carma Hainsworth's Motion for Recusal in 
the absence of Mr. Gardner and counsel, and the ruling on Mr. 
Gardner's corresponding motion was entered without a hearing and in 
his absence. (T. 1118). Mr. Gardner did not waive his right to be 
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present when this important motion was considered. Additionally, 
exhibits submitted to support a Motion for Change of Venue were 
reviewed by the court without Mr. Gardner and counsel. (T. 1205). 
The right to presence has special importance in a capital 
proceeding. See Proffitt v. Wainwricrht, 685 P.2d 1227 (11th Cir. 
1982), modified on reh'g, 706 F.2d 311 (11th Cir. 1983). A 
violation of this fundamental constitutional right requires 
reversal unless the State establishes that the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Codianna, 573 P.2d 343, 
348-49 (Utah 1977); People v. Campbell. 785 P.2d 153 (Colo. App. 
1989). 
The district court below held that Mr. Gardner's right to be 
present at all critical stages of the proceeding was "substantially 
observed." Memorandum Decision, at 11. Additionally, the court 
held that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. 
Gardner respectfully contends that the district court erred in 
reaching these conclusions. 
VII. THE SENTENCING PROCEEDING WAS UNRELIABLE BECAUSE JURORS 
WERE ALLOWED TO CONSIDER IMPERMISSIBLE INFORMATION ABOUT 
THE VICTIM, MICHAEL BURDELL. 
In a capital case, the accused's "punishment must be tailored 
to his personal responsibility and moral guilt." Enmund v. 
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982). While Mr. Gardner's direct 
appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided that 
this principle was violated when the prosecution argued or 
introduced evidence concerning the victim's personal 
characteristics, the emotional impact of the killing on the 
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victim's family and the opinions of family members about the crime 
and the defendant. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 109 S.Ct. 
2207, 104 L.Ed.2d 876 (1989); Booth v. Maryland. 482 U.S. 496 
(1987). 
However, in 1991, the Court reconsidered the issue and held 
that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a state from allowing 
victim impact evidence in a capital sentencing hearing. Payne v. 
Tennessee. Ill S.Ct. 2597 (1991). Notwithstanding this reversal by 
the Payne court, this Court should apply the reasoning of Booth and 
Gathers, and hold that the use of victim impact evidence in a 
capital proceeding is impermissible under the Utah Constitution. 
In Mr. Gardner's case, Bob Macri testified that he knew Mr. 
Burdell very well and that "He had a radio program where he did 
public service work." (T. 2207). In the trial on the merits, the 
prosecutor argued in closing that: 
Isn't it unfortunate we hear so little about 
the victim of the crime? You got to see his 
picture, but you really didn't get to see 
Michael Burdell. You didn't get to meet this 
man, did you? Well, we know that Michael 
Burdell was a human being with life's 
pleasures, with life's challenges and with 
life's opportunities before him, he had a life 
that contributed and would have contributed. 
We know he was a lawyer. We know he did pro 
bono work, and we know just before he was 
killed he was in that archives room joking and 
kibitzing with his associates. 
I think, above everything else, the most 
poignant statement made in this whole trial 
was made by Bob Macri. Remember he said, the 
reason I was i just a bad state afterwards and 
falling apart wasn't because I was frightened, 
no, it was because I felt a tremendous 
sadness. My friend was now dead. Michael 
Burdell had a right to live. He had a right 
to contribute. He had a right to continue to 
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joke and kibitz with his friends. He had a 
right to live. 
(T. 2533-34). The prosecutor then reminded jurors that they were 
representatives of the community. (T. 2534).13 At the same time, 
Mr. Gardner was prevented from countering the effect of this 
improper evidence and argument with testimony that Mr. Burdell's 
relatives and friends did not want a death sentence to be imposed, 
and that Mr. Burdell would have opposed such a punishment, (.51). 
The unacceptable risk that victim impact evidence will produce an 
arbitrary decision therefore was enhanced in Mr. Gardner's case, 
because jurors received a distorted picture of the impact of the 
crime on Mr. Burdell's relatives and friends. 
The Utah Constitution has been interpreted by this Court to 
provide greater protection in capital cases than that required by 
the federal Bill of Rights. See State v. Wood. 648 P.2d 71 (Utah), 
cert, denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982). See also State v. Andrews, No. 
920308 and No. 920309 (Utah July 21, 1992)(J. Durham dissenting). 
Precluding victim impact evidence and argument is compelled by this 
Court's recognition that death is different, and the need for 
heightened reliability in capital punishment decisions. 
Although this argument occurred in the trial on the 
merits rather than the penalty phase, jurors were specifically 
instructed that they could consider evidence presented during the 
guilt phase. (T. 613). Additionally, jurors were instructed that 
they could consider sympathy and sentiment in determining Mr. 
Gardner's punishment. (T. 617). This instruction was not limited 
to sympathy for Mr. Gardner associated with mitigating evidence, 
but could have been read to include sympathy for the victim, Mr. 
Burdell, and Mr. Macri. 
53 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT 
JURORS ON ALL STATUTORY MITIGATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
One of the fundamental principles of capital punishment 
jurisprudence emphasizes the importance of mitigating evidence. 
Under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, jurors in a capital 
sentencing proceeding may "not be precluded from considering as a 
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record 
and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant 
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett v. 
Ohio. 438 U.S. 586 (1976); accord, e.g.. Penrv v. Lvnauqh. 492 U.S. 
302 (1989); Mills v. Maryland. 486 U.S. 367 (1988); Eddinas v. 
Oklahoma. 455 U.S. 104 (1982). 
Under Utah's capital punishment scheme, "[m]itigating 
circumstances shall include, [inter alia, the fact that "The 
defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial 
domination of another person. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2)(c). 
In the instant case, the penalty phase instructions given by 
the trial court omitted a definition of this subsection (2)(c) 
mitigating circumstance.14 The failure to include the subsection 
(2)(c) mitigating circumstance in jury instructions deprived Mr. 
Gardner of his right to have jurors consider and give effect to all 
mitigating evidence presented at trial. 
Although the circumstances in this case did not show that 
14
 The circumstances in subsections (a) and (f) also were 
omitted, but apparently were withdrawn by counsel, according to the 
trial judge's notation on an instruction tendered by the defense. 
(T. 535). 
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another person was coercing Mr. Gardner into his actions at the 
time of the offense, the jury reasonably could have determined that 
he was in a state of physical duress, as that term is popularly 
understood.15 Mr. Gardner's construction of the (2)(c) 
mitigating is appropriate in light of the fundamental principle 
that mitigating circumstances must be broadly interpreted in favor 
of the defendant. See, e.g., Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 
1 (1986). 
In the proceedings below, the district court agreed with the 
State that the instructions given at trial allowed jurors to 
consider Mr. Gardner's physical condition as mitigating evidence. 
Memorandum Decision, at 30-31. According to the State, during the 
trial on the merits, Mr. Gardner had presented evidence of his 
physical condition, and the jury was instructed in the penalty 
phase that it could consider "any other fact in mitigation of the 
penalty." 
It is true that Mr. Gardner had attempted in the trial on the 
merits to present the defense that the physical effects of the 
gunshot wound he received prevented him from forming the mental 
state necessary for conviction of first degree murder. However, in 
the penalty phase, jurors were instructed that they were not to 
consider any residual doubts as to Mr. Gardner's guilt. (T. 612-
13). The harm caused by the failure to instruct on subsection (c) 
The word "duress" is synonymous, inter alia, with the 
words "force" and "stress." See, W. Burton, Legal Thesaurus. P. 
191 (1980). Clearly, force or stress could come from a physical 
source. 
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was exacerbated rather than alleviated. 
Further, the general instruction that jurors could consider 
any other fact in mitigation was not an effective substitute for a 
charge in accordance with subsection (2)(c). This general 
instruction did not provide specific guidance or direction that 
jurors could consider Mr. Gardner's physical condition during the 
shooting as a reason to show mercy. 
Jurors were unconstitutionally precluded from giving 
mitigating effect to the fact that Mr. Gardner had been shot in the 
chest immediately before killing Mr. Burdell. The jury's 
sentencing decision therefore was constitutionally unreliable. 
U.S. Const., Am. VIII and XIV; Utah Const., Art. I, §§ 7 and 9. 
IX. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING AN INSTRUCTION THAT 
WOULD HAVE INFORMED JURORS THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD TO 
ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
In the penalty phase of trial, the trial court refused to give 
the following instruction offered by Mr. Gardner: 
Before you consider any fact as an aggravating 
circumstance, you must find that that fact has 
been established by the evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt. You may not consider any 
for choosing to impose the death sentence 
unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable 
doubt (and to a moral certainty) that that 
fact is true. 
(T. 532). This instruction was necessary to adequately channel the 
jury's discretion and ensure that the punishment decision was 
reliable. U.S. Const., Am. VIII and XIV; Utah Const., Art. I, §§ 
7 and 9. 
In Utah, before a death sentence, can be ordered, the 
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prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the totality 
of evidence of aggravating circumstances outweighs the totality of 
evidence of mitigating circumstances and that death is the 
appropriate punishment. State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982). In the district court below, the 
State agreed that the Wood decision implied a need for a finding as 
to the existence of aggravation. 
In requiring jurors to find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances and 
that death is the appropriate punishment, the Wood opinion exceeds 
what has been mandated in some other states for the imposition of 
a death sentence. In creating additional protections, this Court 
recognized that imposing the death penalty is "the most solemn and 
final act that the state can take against an individual." 648 P.2d 
at 80. Because the decision to impose the death penalty laws must 
occur judiciously and fairly, the guarantees inherent in due 
process of law must apply to the capital sentencing proceeding. 
648 P.2d at 80-81. The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is a fundamental component of due process. In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
Other jurisdictions have declined to follow Wood because of a 
belief that "While the existence of an aggravating or mitigating 
circumstance is a fact susceptible to proof under a reasonable 
doubt standard, the relative weight is not." Ford v. Strickland, 
696 F.2d 804, 818 (11th Cir. 1983) (Citations omitted). 
Significantly, some jurisdictions not requiring a Wood instruction 
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on weighing do apply the reasonable doubt standard to the proof or 
existence of aggravating circumstances. E.g., State v. Simants, 
250 N.W.2d 881, 888 (Neb. 1977). 
The existence of aggravating circumstances must be established 
before they can be weighed against mitigating circumstances. The 
fact finding function in a trial on the merits is analogous to 
determining the existence of aggravating circumstances, and the 
standard of proof should be applied. See State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 
at 84, n.10; see also. Lewis v. Jeffers. 110 S.Ct. 3092 (1990). 
Moreover, this Court has stated explicitly that "The State has 
the burden of proof as to the existence of aggravating factors and 
must show that they 'outweigh' the mitigating factors." State v. 
Holland, 777 P. 2d 1019, 1025 (Utah 1989) (Emphasis added). 
Additionally, "A jury must first determine the existence of 
aggravating factors before it can determine their weight." State 
v. Parsons. 781 P.2d 1275, 1280 (Utah 1989). 
Although the need for the instruction requested by Mr. Gardner 
flows directly from State v. Wood, the district court declined to 
grant postconviction relief based on the trial court's refusal to 
give it. According to the district court, the trial court properly 
refused the instruction because this was a "previously 
unarticulated basis for challenging a death sentence in Utah." 
Memorandum Decision, at 31. The language requested by Mr. Gardner 
was compelled by the logic and reasoning of Wood, in spite of the 
fact that no Utah appellate court had required a similar 
instruction. The district court erred in concluding that the 
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instruction was not necessary. 
X. MR. GARDNER'S RIGHTS TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, 
TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND TO A FAIR HEARING HAVE BEEN VIOLATED 
BY THE DISTRICT COURT'S REFUSAL TO APPOINT AN INVESTIGATOR AND 
EXPERT WITNESSES TO ASSIST MR. GARDNER; THE REFUSAL TO PROVIDE 
THIS ASSISTANCE IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINT ON MR. 
GARDNER'S ABILITY TO PRESENT HIS CASE. 
At all times during the postconviction proceeding below, Mr. 
Gardner has asserted that he is entitled to the assistance of 
investigators and expert witnesses to help him present his case. 
Particularly, Mr. Gardner has argued that this assistance is 
crucial to his efforts to demonstrate that trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance. However, as the district court found, the 
State vigorously opposed Mr. Gardner's requests and they, 
therefore, were denied. 
Nevertheless, the State argued below and now contends in this 
Court that Mr. Gardner should not receive a new sentencing hearing 
or a new appeal because he has not demonstrated the prejudice 
required by the second prong of the Strickland v. Washington test. 
The district court recognized the inherent unfairness in the 
State's argument, and the "Catch-22" Mr. Gardner now faces. 
Memorandum Decision, at P.24. 
A defendant's right to the assistance of a competent mental 
health expert to assist in his defense is so fundamental and so 
important that it is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Ake 
v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985); Smith v. McCormick. 914 F.2d 
1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1990). Courts have "recognized a particularly 
critical interrelation between expert psychiatric assistance and 
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minimally effective assistance of counsel." United States v. 
Edwards, 488 F.2d 1154, 1163 (5th Cir. 1974). The need for 
investigative assistance also is clearly established. The district 
court recognized the necessity of the assistance Mr. Gardner 
sought, but accepted the State's arguments that Utah statutes 
precluded providing defense assistance in postconviction. As 
argued in Mr. Gardner's Motion for Appointment of Investigator and 
Experts, the court's conclusion was incorrect. 
The failure to provide essential assistance here has violated 
Mr. Gardner's rights to due process, to meaningful access to the 
courts and to equal protection of the law and has precluded a full 
and fair hearing on Mr. Gardner's postconviction claims. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and authorities, Mr. Gardner 
respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
decision to grant him a new sentencing hearing and new direct 
appeal. Mr. Gardner requests the Court to reverse the denial of 
relief on all other grounds. 
Respectfully submitted this X X day of January, 1993. 
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